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Judith Resnik*
In the late 1970s, when I first started teaching large law school classes,
a colleague gave me what he took to be very kind advice. He said:
Be careful. Don't teach in any areas associated with women's
issues. Don't teach family law, don't teach sex discrimination.
Don't teach trusts and estates. Teach the real stuff, the hard stuff:
contracts, torts, procedure, property-and don't be too visible on
women's issues.
I came to the large classroom setting after teaching in a clinical program. At
the time, I was working on articles about procedure, habeas corpus, and
women in prison. I taught and wrote about all three topics. After a few
years, I had to admit that my colleague's remarks were descriptively close to
the mark. My virtually all-male colleagues were more interested in my work
on procedure and federal courts and less interested in my work on women
in prisons.
I have told this anecdote before, and by its telling learned that my
experience is in no way idiosyncratic, nor is it a tale of any particular law
school in the United States. Others have documented and described the
problems women face as law teachers. The articles'by Marina Angel,1 by
Richard Chused, 2 and by several participants in this symposium3 provide
both qualitative and quantitative detail. Unfortunately, these descriptions
are not of historical significance alone. In 1989, I was the chair of the
Section on Women in Legal Education of the Association of American Law
Schools. During that year, I repeatedly heard examples of the risks of being
identified with "women's issues." In 1991, when writing and giving talks
that invoke feminist theory, I continue to encounter disinterest in, and
sometimes'hostility to, feminist scholarship and commentary.
Thus, the advice to stay away from "women's issues" is still given. But
something has changed. Many of us are challenging the assumption
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embedded in that advice-that there are separable, identifiable "women's
issues." Think about the words: "Be careful; don't teach in any area
associated with women's issues." What is the referent? What are the areas not
associated with "women's issues"? Jean Love's materials on torts,4 Thomas
Wartenberg's essay on philosophy,5 the almost 100-page bibliography
prepared for this symposium, 6 and the discussion during the conference
have all rhade plain that, if I don't teach in areas related to women's issues,
I just can't teach. All areas of law are connected to and touch on "women's
issues." 7
My purpose in this speech is to sketch a few of the many places in
which "women's issues" illuminate procedure and federal courts, two
subjects about which I teach and write regularly.8 Let me begin with
procedure, with the role of the judge, and with the feminist issues
embedded in any conversation about appropriate 'Judicial" behavior.
Women as judges in the United States is a relatively recent phenomenon. 9
When some women take on that role, they respond in ways that raise
questions about the range of behavior permissible to judges.
Take the recent case involving Judge Lynne Hufnagel of the Denver
District Court. Judge Hufnagel rearranged the furniture in her courtroom
to respond to the needs of the elderly, the handicapped, and children. The
New York Times offered this description: "Judge Hufnagel steps down
from the bench to greet young witnesses at the courtroom door, then walks
them to a special seat with its back to the defendant [but] facing the jury."'1
In late 1987, a man named Frank Travis Green was accused of sexually
abusing a young girl. He was tried before Judge Hufnagel. As was her
custom, Judge Hufnagel escorted the young girl and another young witness
to and from the witness seat in the courtroom. Green was convicted, and he
appealed. The appellate court reversed the conviction." That court held:
"It is axiomatic that a trial judge must be free of all taint of bias and
partiality .... .2 The court concluded that Judge Hufnagel's activity-of
4. Jean Love, Bringing Gender Issues Into the Torts Course, Torts and Retorts
(Newsletter, Ass'n of Am, L. Sch., Section on Torts-Compensation Systems), Fall 1989, at 4.
5. Thomas Wartenberg, Teaching Women Philosophy, 11 Teaching Phil. 15 (1988).
6. Paul George & Susan McGlamery, Women and Legal Scholarship: A Bibliography, 77
Iowa L. Rev. 87 (1991).
7. For further discussion of efforts to ignore gender issues, see Judith Resnik, Naturally
Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts (forthcoming 1992); Deborah
Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 Yale L.J.
1731 (1991).
8. For development of the themes raised here, see Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The
Nature and Allocation of Work in the Federal Trial Courts, in Feminism Jurisprudence
Symposium, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 909 (1990);Judith Resnik, On the Bias, Feminist Reconsiderations
for the Aspirations of Our Judges, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1877 (1988); Judith Resnik & Carolyn
Heilbrun, Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism, 99 Yale L.J. 1913 (1990).
9. See generally, National Center for State Courts, Women in the Courts 85-105 (Winifred
L. Hepperle & Laura Crites eds., f978).
10. Lis Wiehl, National Rules for Child Witnesses?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1990, at B12.
11. People v. Green, No. 88CA0230 (Colo. Ct. App. June 22, 1989).
12. Id. at 2 (citing People v. District Court, 560 P.2d 828, 831 (Colo. 1977)).
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helping the girls to the witness chair-breached that norm.'8
Certainly, the idea of fair judging is well worth praising, and certainly,
the act itself of being a fair judge is extremely complex. 14 But is the
assumption of the Colorado Court of Appeals correct-that ajury perceives
a fixed, immobile judge (one who ignores the physical characteristics of
certain witnesses) as the embodiment of impartiality and perceives a judge
who assists child witnesses to their seats as partial to those witnesses? Think
about the words used in the United States to describe the appropriate
judicial stance: "disinterest," "disengagement," and "impartiality." As many
have detailed, these aspirations are not followed fully in practice' 5 and,
equally as important, miss a good deal of how judges do and should behave.
I understand, both as a litigator and as a teacher of procedure, that judges
are engaged, embedded, and deeply dependent-on the culture and
government that empowers them and on the lawyers and litigants before
them. Judges cannot escape these connections and responsibilities; the
questions are about how to capture and to cabin that interaction. When
teaching about the role of the judge, it is incumbent upon me to explore
with students the nature of judicial dependence as well as judicial
independence. 16
My next example comes from questions of jurisdiction and the
allocation of authority among different judges within the federal system.
On April 2, 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee (FCSC) issued its
report.' 7 Congress created the FCSC in 1988 in legislation directing the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court to appoint fifteen people
to consider the future of the federal court system.' 8 In many respects, the
FCSC Report is a stunning piece of work. In just over a year, fifteen people
wrote what is in essence a book on a wide-ranging set of topics related to
federal courts. My purpose here is not to elaborate the strengths and
13. According to the court, the "trial judge's actions towards the child witnesses could have
been perceived by the jurors as an indication that the trial judge believed in the credibility of
the children who were testifying." Id. In another case, People v. Rogers, 800 P.2d 1327 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1990), the Colorado Court of Appeals again reversed a conviction in which Judge
Hufnagel had escorted a child to the seat, assigned a staff person to sit next to her, and
provided water. In Rogers, the trial judge also instructed the jury that "by doing these things
I'm not implying, nor are you to understand that I am implying, any opinion as to [the victim's]
credibility or any weight to be given to her testimony. You're to apply the same standards
judging her credibility that you would to any other witness. I merely do these things to try to
make testimony for younger children easier." Id. at 1329.
14. See John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 237 (1987); Judith Resnik, On the Bias, supra note 8.
15. See, e.g., Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: An Emerging Focus for
Judicial Reform, 21 Ariz. St. L.J. 237 (1989) (summarizing the problems of gender-based
discrimination in courts and the efforts by many states to document and address these
problems).
16. See Robert M. Cover, Owen M. Fiss, &Judith Resnik, Procedure 180-427; 1316-1569
(1988) (Ch. 2: The Forms of Adjudication and Ch. 6: Decision Centers and Their Authority).
17. Federal Courts Study Committee, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee
(1990) [hereinafter FCSC Report].
18. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102
Stat. 4642 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 331 "note").
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weaknesses of the FCSC Report, but rather to highlight how, in discussions
of the federal courts, feminist theory helps illuminate contemporary issues.
Among the many recommendations of the FCSC Report are a few
about the allocation of judicial power-between federal and state courts,
and between Article III judges (appointed pursuant to Article III of the
Constitution and having life tenure and salaries protected from
diminution) 19 and non-Article III judges (administrative law judges, bank-
ruptcy judges, and magistrates judges, whose positions are created pursu-
ant to legislation and who have fixed terms). In addition to the roughly 600
Article III judges, today's federal judiciary includes some 300 full-time
magistrates and another 300 full-time bankruptcy judges, all of whom are
authorized to work at a range of tasks including pretrial management,
discovery supervision, adjudication of motions, and presiding at trials. 20
The FCSC Report focused on and emphasized the specialness of the
Article III judiciary: "the federal judiciary is composed most importantly of
Article III judges." 2' Urging that this group of judges be kept very small,
the Report cited the suggestion that "1,000 is the practical ceiling."22 One
of the reasons offered is that a
judge who felt like simply a tiny cog in a vast wheel that would
turn at the same speed whatever the judge did would not
approach the judicial task with the requisite sense that power must
be exercised responsibly-especially when that judge by reason of
having life tenure, lacked the usual incentives to perform assigned
tasks energetically and responsibly.23
This description-about what motivates Article III judges-is animated by
assumptions that judges work hard in order to make money, to obtain
promotions, to avoid being demoted or fired, and to feel important or to
obtain recognition from others. Given that Article IIIjudges are unlikely to
be fired (or, with occasional exception, to be promoted) or to experience
major changes in their salaries, the argument is that Article III judgeships
must offer status and prestige to attract competent people to the bench and
then to keep their work at a high level of quality. But the size of the federal
judiciary has become problematic, because the number of cases filed at both
trial and appellate levels has increased over the past few decades. To
maintain Article IIIjudges as a small and thus elite group, the FCSC Report
recommended reallocating work so that non-Article III judges assume
some of the tasks currently assigned to Article III judges.
The FCSC report, like other commentary about the structure of
adjudication in the federal system, is thus filled with comments about the
nature and value of different kinds of work and with proposals to create
and maintain hierarchies of workers to undertake different but related
19. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 633 (1991); 28 U.S.C. '§ 152 (1991); and Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director at 46-47 (1989) (data on authorized
positions as of June 30, 1989).
21. FCSC Report, supra note 17, at 69.
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 7.
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tasks. These topics are familiar ones to readers of feminist theory,, which
discusses the kind of work that women do in the United States,24 about
comparable worth, the ranking of occupations, and sex segregation in the
workplace. 25 When teaching and writing about the contemporary transfor-
mation of the "federal courts," feminist literature devoted to examining
work among individuals holding different social statuses provides a rich
resource. I detail a few of these intersections below.
First, one of the disappointments for me in reading the FCSC Report
is that its recommendations about structure were derived with relatively
little discussion of the activity of judging itself. Research for the Report did
include questionnaires, which asked about the stresses, the caseload pres-
sures, the reliance on law clerks, the time for reflection-all of the daily
experiences of being a judge. Those questions were sent to Article III trial
judges. 26 But the body of the Report does not give detail about the
responses to those questions, nor were similar questions asked of those
individuals (magistrates and bankruptcy judges) who are also "federal
judges" but who lack Article III status. Hence, it is difficult to assess
whether the FCSC Report's claims of the need for prestige, visibility, and
small numbers of Article III judges are shared by individual Article III
judges themselves and whether those judges find that the activities of
judging provide sufficient incentives for responsible, energetic
performance. 27 Moreover, because no comparable data were collected for
non-Article III judges, we have not learned what animates their work.
Feminist research might have offered another approach. One method
is to look closely at the experiences and practices of those in a given field or
line of work and to attempt to build proposals for change out of those
experiences. Take, for example, the activities involved when people pro-
24. See, e.g., Nancy F. Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood: "Woman's Sphere" in New
England, 1780-1835 (1977); Dolores Hayden, Redesigning the American Dream: The Future
of Housing, Work, & Family Life (1984); Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender & the Family
(1989); Deborah Rhode, Justice and Gender (1989).
25. See, e.g., Roslyn L. Feldberg, Comparable Worth: Toward Theory and Practice in the
United States, 10 Signs 311 (1984); Symposium: Approaching Pay Equity Through Compa-
rable Worth, 45J. Soc. Issues 1 (1989) (Rosemary Hays Lowe & Michele Andrisin Wittig eds.);
Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism 58-81 (1986) (Ch. 3); Vicki Schultz,
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1750
(1990).
26. See 2 Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports
(July 1, 1990) (copy of questionnaire and summary of responses under "Additional Miscella-
neous Documents") (not paginated). Photocopies of answered questionnaires are on file with
the author.
27. Each questionnaire provided space for additional information on "caseload pressures"
and their impact on work habits. Responses were wide ranging. For example, one judge
described the federal district court workload as "nirvana" compared to the state judicial system
in which that judge had worked. Another stated that the "day [the job] becomes a drudge is the
day you should start worrying." In contrast, many protested the working conditions. One
stated that the caseload pressure requiring work "seven nights a week, [was] intense and
unreasonable;" another commented that "there are simply too many civil cases to push
through the system, too many motions, and far, far too many criminal cases, for any human
being to be satisfied that he or she is dispensing justice, rather than pushing cases and papers
out the door." Photocopies of the questionnaire responses are on file with the author.
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vide care for others-often, but not only, for children and the elderly.
Feminist political theorist Sara Ruddick has thought a good deal about the
nature of that work.28 Her thesis is that "maternal thinking"-the work and
social practices that are "demanded" by children's needs "that their lives be
preserved and their growth fostered" in ways "acceptable" to the culture of
which they are a part29-would also inform the political world. For
Ruddick, being a "mother" is not a biologically-based but a socially-based
category.3 0 That work constantly reminds one that one is both very
powerful (often in control of another's activities) and also powerless
(helpless to prevent illness or safeguard children from war). Ruddick seeks
to have political and legal decisionmakers understand that they, like
mothers, are both powerful and powerless. She argues that paradigm
behaviors and attitudes engendered by mothering, long dismissed as
irrelevant to the political sphere, have much to teach.
Ruddick's claims about the nature of mothering are controversial; I
raise them here not to endorse or debate them but to use them as
exemplary of another methodological approach. The point is that Ruddick
built her theory based on close examination of the experience of people
engaged in the activity of mothering. Such theory based on the lived-
experiences of those affected is central to most feminist work.3' Such an
approach would have well-served those concerned about the federal
judiciary, for all its judges, Article III and non-Article III alike, have the
power to judge. The restructuring of the federal judiciary should proceed
from knowledge of the experiences of the 600 Article III trial judges and
the equal number of federal judges who lack life tenure but who also do the
work of judging in the federal system.
Ruddick's claim that mothering is an activity seldom examined for its
political and social implications brings me to another aspect of the FCSC's
recommendations-in which a proposal is made to allocate much of the
judicial work in social security cases to judges outside the Article III
judiciary. Once again, theory is built top-down. Aside from its procedural
complexity and redundancy, little description of the experience of being a
decisionmaker in social security litigation is provided. One FCSC proposal
is to create an Article I court without life-tenured judges to hear social
security claims challenging federal government decisions to withhold
disability payments.3 2 This new court would decide questions of "fact" and
would leave only "questions of law" to be decided by the life-tenured Article
III judges. 33 Because the FCSC Report stipulated that Article III judges
were the most important workers in the federal judiciary, an implicit
28. Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 Feminist Stud. 342 (1980); Sara Ruddick,
Maternal Thinking (1989). The citations that follow are all to the 1989 book.
29. Ruddick, supra note 28, at 17-21.
30. Id. at 40-41.
31. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829 (1990).
32. FCSO Report, supra note 17, at 55. Dissenting from this recommendation were FCSC
members, The Honorable Joseph Weisjoined by Edward S.G. Dennis,Jr., and Morris Harrell.
Senator Charles E. Grassley dissented separately. Id. at 58.
33. Id. at 56.
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assumption is that such judges do the most "important" work. What is
relegated to other judges-in this context, decisions about whether disabil-
ity benefits have been wrongly terminated-is thus deserving of less
attention from the most "important" workers and may therefore be
perceived to be less important work.
Decades of feminism, inter alia, demonstrate that there is a good deal
of controversy about what work is and ought to be valued and about whose
perspective on what tasks is and ought to be adopted. The process of
"naming"-providing detailed descriptions of specific activities-is one
feminist strategy used to challenge assumptions about a given activity's
value. 4 In the context of the allocation of work between Article I and
Article III judges, detailing the nature of social security work helps to
explain the temptation-by any with sufficient power to do so-to avoid
that work. Naming also raises questions about how that work might be
restructured for those who do it, and what value should be accorded to
deciding such cases.
In many social security disability cases, a claimant argues the existence
of a physical or mental disability that interferes with the capacity to work.
The government disputes the claim, and the judge (initially under current
provisions, an administrative law judge) must assess whether the evidence
is sufficient to terminate benefits. In addition to understanding the
applicable regulations, described by one author as "highly technical and
complex,"35 the decisionmaker must also evaluate medical evidence, infor-
mation about vocational skills, and the credibility of witnesses. The ques-
tions in disability cases often involve finding "facts" about the relationship
between an individual's described experience of pain and her or his capacity
to obtain gainful employment.36 Without benefits, many recipients who are
already economically marginal become desperately poor. Not only are these
cases often filed by litigants who lack lawyers, but the claims themselves may
be exceedingly difficult to articulate. "Physical pain does not simply resist
language but actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to
a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes
before language is learned. '37
Many social security cases are thus cases of dependency-dependency
in the sense that individuals are economically needy and dependency in the
sense that the litigants are more dependent upon trial judges for assistance,
interpretation, and patience, than are those who can afford able lawyering.
These cases can be very difficult for decisionmakers-who may feel
34. See Marie Withers Osmand & Barrie Thorne, Feminist Theories: The Social Construc-
tion of Gender in Families and Society, in Sourcebook of Family Theories and Methods
(Pauline Boss, William Doherty, Ralph LaRossa, Walter Schumm, Suzanne Steinmetz eds., in
press) (manuscript on file with author); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Consciousness Raising, in
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (1989).
35. See Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations for
Reform, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 467 (Professor Levy provided research assistance to the
FCSC). See Richard A. Posner, Introduction to the Federal Courts Symposium, 1990 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1, 1-2.
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)(d)(2)(A) (1991); Levy, supra note 35, at 492-93.
37. Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World 4 (1985).
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powerless to affect an individual's pain or to interpret rules in a manner that
seems responsive to, let alone alleviating of, suffering. Occasionally, deci-
sionmakers may feel jubilantly powerful because they cafi prevent govern-
ment from wrongfully withholding benefits, alter administrative interpre-
tations of rules, or preclude those not disabled from claiming moneys
allocated by Congress for the truly needy. These cases involve" factfinding,
the complex and messy activity of interacting with litigants, witnesses, and
sometimes lawyers, in an effort to make sense of a morass of information.
Factfinding requires decisionmakers to hear different versions or interpre-
tations of events and then demands that decisionmakers attempt construc-
tion and reconstruction of those events. In many federal benefits cases, all
that work is needed to render judgments about amounts of money
important to the claimant but perhaps seen as "small" in contrast to the
amounts at stake in other "federal" cases.
The issue raised in the context of federal benefit cases is of broader
application. The proposal to allocate "factfinding" in social welfare cases to
non-Article III judges is illustrative of a general assumption about factfind-
ing in the literature of both procedure and federal courts. A distinction is
commonly drawn between the work of factfinding (often relegated either to
juries or to "lower tier" judges) and that of lawmaking (often decided by
higher echelon actors-appellate judges), 8 What is factfinding all about?
How might we talk about it? What are the skills needed to do factfinding?
Are such skills necessarily less valuable, less rare, or less demanding than
those used in deciding questions of law?
In my experience as a clinical law teacher, I have always found it easier
to prepare students (and myself) for appellate arguments than for trials or
hearings. I can anticipate about ninety percent of what an appellate bench
will ask and, with the help of colleagues, I can simulate an appellate
argument. It is far more difficult to anticipate the complicated dynamics of
trial, with its set of live actors, rather than a "record appendix." Is it
"harder" to be a trial judge than an "appellate" judge? Should more value
be attached to one aspect of judging than another? Is it important that
judges who sit on appeal have some first-hand experience, by working on
trial benches, with how records come into being? Implicit in these questions
is my sense that the FCSC Report was too quick to assume that factfinding
was not a central and difficult task to be shared by Article III and
non-Article III judges. What is needed is examination of the actual work of
first-tier judges-not only their work on trials but their work as managers,
negotiators, and settlers of a range of kind of cases 39-before one shifts
work from one set of judges to another.
Relevant to this analysis of the respective spheres for Article HI and
non-Article III judges is another topic of feminist theory-one that goes by
the shorthand "essentialism" and which has different aspects. Some have
used the term to ascribe an "essential" nature to those within the category
38. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (state court findings of fact reviewed in federal court only
under specified conditions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (federal trial courts' findings of fact reviewed
under "clearly erroneous" standard).
39. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982).
[1991]
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of "women. '40 Others have criticized as "essentialist" some feminists who
tend to describe aspects of "woman" as unchanging across race, culture,
class, and sexual preference.4 1 The language of essentialism also appears in
discussions of the federal judiciary: Supreme Court opinions speak of the
"essential attributes of judicial power. '42
How might understandings gained from critical analysis of essential-
ism in feminism inform the conversation about the federal judiciary? One
might, for example, argue that Article III judges, by virtue of the
constitutional selection process and guaranteed jobs, are more important
than any other set of judges in the United States. An alternative claim
would be that it is not their "essence" as creatures of Article III, but rather
the work that they do, the cases that they decide, that makes them more
important. Yet another claim would be that the value attributed to Article
IIIjudges depends, in part, upon the existence of non-Article IIIjudges-
just as being "manly" may depend upon the existence of "womanly" traits
to be avoided.
Some of the complexities of defining what constitutes "Article III-
ness" are readily revealed in Supreme Court cases. The Court cannot
decide whether it is the nature of Article III judges' work (a general
caseload that includes civil and criminal cases, the power to punish by
contempt, the conduct of jury trials, and the like) or the structural
protections accorded the judges (their nomination by the president, con-
firmation by the Senate, and life tenure), or some combination thereof that
delineates Article III adjudication from non-Article III adjudication. 43 As a
consequence, it is difficult to decide which delegations ofjudging are either
constitutional or wise.44 Mapping case law and commentary against femi-
nist examinations of essentialism clarifies the sources of the arguments
made for the "specialness" of Article III judges.
Who should do factfinding in social security disability cases? In other
40. For critical commentary of this approach, see R.W. Connell, Gender and Power:
Society, the Person and Sexual Politics 54-62 (1987) (describing "categorical theory" as
contrasted with "practice-based theory"); Nancy Fraser & Linda J. Nicholson, Social Criticism
Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and Postmodernism in Feminism/
Postmodernism (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
41. See, e.g., Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L.
Rev. 581 (1990).
42. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 77
(1982) (using the phrase "essential attributes ofjudicial power") (quoting Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). Both Northern Pipeline and Crowell address the question of what
authority may constitutionally be given to non-Article III federal judges.
43. See, e.g., Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986);
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). A current example of how to delineate Article III judges from
others is the issue of whether bankruptcy judges, as well as Article III judges, can preside at
jury trials. See In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded to
consider jurisdictional issues, 111 S. Ct. 425 (1991), on remand, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991); see also Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
44. See Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 581
(1985).
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kinds of cases? The "most important" members of the federal judiciary?
Less important members of the judiciary? Should the work be concentrated
in a particular set of judges or distributed? How might those judges with
less prestige be reconsidered and the value of their work appreciated? What
is the interaction between the class, race, and gender of litigants and the
prestige of the judges who preside over their cases? These are the questions
for the federal judiciary today, as new hierarchies are being created by
federal court practices.4 5 To think about the various activities of judging,
the status of judges, and the allocatioh of jurisdiction is to think about the
nature and the value of the work done. To choose one hierarchy and to
focus on the problems of one set of actors (the already relatively-privileged
Article III judges), in contrast to another (magistrates or bankruptcyjudges, for example), is to make decisions about social and political
conceptions of how to achieve a "good" society.4 6 These are, of course,
"women's issues," just as they are at the core of conversations about the
future of the federal courts.
Indeed, the absence of feminist analyses is somewhat surprising, given
that phrases associated with women crop up with fair frequency in those
conversations. The connection between hierarchies and women's work is
overt-made so by the very words chosen to ascribe value. In the subject
areas of procedure and federal courts, if one wants to say that something is
unimportant, a stock phrase (if one chooses to use it) is available-that
something is just "a housekeeping rule." For example, Justices Black and
Douglas, dissenting from the promulgation of amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, wrote:
We believe that while some of the Rules of Civil Procedure are simply
housekeeping details, many determine matters so substantially affect-
ing the rights of litigants . . . that in practical effect they are the
equivalent of new legislation . . .47
With the miracle of computers, I looked at how Article III judges have
used the word "housekeeping." As I detail elsewhere,48 Article III judges
have used the word often, but over the life of the federal judiciary the use
of the word "housekeeping" has changed. A first use was to indicate the
activity of creating and maintaining a personal household. According to the
federal courts, both men and women set up or "went to" housekeeping.4 9 A
45. See Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 3 (Article III appellate judges' delegation of work on prisoner and social
security cases to staff attorneys and law clerks).
46. See Okin, supra note 24.
47. Statement of Justice Black and Justice Douglas on the promulgation of amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 374 U.S. 865, 865-66 (1963) (footnote omitted).
48. Resnik, Housekeeping, supra note 8, at 914-33.
49. Penfield v. Chesapeake, Ohio and Southwestern R.R., 134 U.S. 351, 355 (1890)
(personal injury action in which proof of residence was argued on the basis that the wife of an
injured traveling salesperson had "hired a house and went to house-keeping"); Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 312 (1942) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (involving the validity of a
divorce obtained in Nevada; the couple "set up housekeeping as husband and wife").
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second use emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century; judges
spoke about the care and maintenance of public places and businesses as
"housekeeping."50 Thereafter, a third usage of the word emerged. "House-
keeping" moved from the maintenance work in the material sense to the
idea that the rules by which institutions run were themselves "housekeep-
ing" rules.51 Fourth, and only common since the 1960s, the word "house-
keeping" has come to mean an activity of lesser order.
This fourth sense depends upon the existence of two sets of rules or
two sets of institutions, such as federal and state courts or courts and
agencies. One institution characterizes either its own rules or those of
another as "housekeeping," and with such characterization may come
permission either to employ or to ignore a given rule, statute, or practice.
I should note that the deployment of the label "housekeeping" is itself
complex and deserves more exploration than I will provide here.5 2 Suffice
it to point out that sometimes, claiming that a particular rule is "house-
keeping" is the basis for asserting authority to rely upon that rule,55 while
upon other occasions the claim that a rule is "housekeeping" is the very
reason to ignore it.54
Part of the reason that the term "housekeeping" can be used to
trivialize an activity or the assertion of power embodied in that term is that
"housekeeping" has a gender. The gender is female; it is we (women) and
we are the "second sex."155 And, just as a range of behaviors and activities
are trivialized as "women's work," so can one find a plentiful array of issues
characterized as "housekeeping" in case law-from claims of executive
privilege to federal prosecutions of individuals who have already been
50. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40,43 (1989) (question ofjurisdiction of
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act when claim was brought by
injured laborers who provided "housekeeping and janitorial services"); FTC v. Texaco, Inc.,
393 U.S. 223, 227 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (provisions in a contract for a gas station
franchise relating to the "use and appearance of the station" referred to as "housekeeping
provisions").
51. Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 n.39 (1979) (5 U.S.C. § 301,
"Departmental Regulations," which authorizes the heads of federal departments and agencies
to make rules for those departments, as the "federal housekeeping statute").
52. See Resnik, Housekeeping, supra note 8.
53. As in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-74 (1965).
54. See, e.g., Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473,482 (1981) (federal statute obliging the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to certify the availability of adequate "treatment facilities"
prior to permitting state prisoners to be housed in federal prisons is "simply a housekeeping
measure" and does not require that prisoners so transferred be "in need of treatment");
Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173 (1954) (failure to comply with executive order
requiring United States Attorneys to obtain Justice Department authorization prior to
presenting information on tax violations to a grand jury was not the basis for violating a
conviction).
By ignoring an activity labeled "housekeeping," a claim is silenced-a phenomenon again
familiar to feminists. See Tillie Olsen, Silences (1978); Stephanie M. Wildman, The Question
of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38J. Legal Educ. 147 (1988) in the
symposium, Women in Legal Education-Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and Practice.
55. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (1953).
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prosecuted by a state. 56 Given its current deployment, I would like to see
"housekeeping" acquire a fifth sense. Whenever that word appears as the
characterization of a particular activity, I would like the reader to see it as
a flag-as a reason to question the claim of value being made. One quick
example: the legislative hearings that created the FCSC were entitled
'Judicial Housekeeping, '57 chosen presumably to downplay the political
significance of the creation of a commission to make recommendations
about the structure of the federal courts. The very title should underscore,
not mask, the political content of proposals to alter court jurisdiction.
"Women's issues" are thus a part of the discussion of the role ofjudge,
the allocation and valuation of judicial work, the jurisdiction of federal and
state courts, of Article I and Article III judges. Gender comes into play
whenever I teach; all courses implicate "women's issues." Gender also
comes into play whenever I write, one example of which is the way in which
this essay-and many other feminist articles-depart from standard law
journal format.58 I have raised a series of questions about judging and
56. See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173 (1954); United States v. Howard, 590
F.2d 564, 567-78 (4th Cir. 1979) (federal and state government may prosecute individual for
same criminal behavior if it violates each "sovereign's" criminal laws); Legal Aid Soc'y v.
Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1329 n.14 (9th Cir. 1979) (executive orders requiring evaluations of
inflationary impacts of legislation referred to as "housekeeping"); United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 174 F. Supp. 233, 238 (D. N.J. 1959) (claims of executive privilege referred to as
"housekeeping").
57, Judicial Housekeeping, 1988: Hearing on H.R. 3227 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1988).
58. A second example is the form of footnote citation, which has recently changed. In
1990, Kate Bartlett, in her article Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 31, opened with a
footnote that explained her regret at not being able to persuade the journal's editors to use the
first names of those she cited. 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 829. As she detailed, a system of citation
that used only last names assumes the irrelevance of gender. Moreover, in a society such as the
United States in which men's last names in lieu of women's often become the "family" name,
a woman's first name may be the only name that is hers.
Progress has occurred on the citation front. Carolyn Heilbrun and I published an article
after Kate Bartlett. We were able to persuade the editors to include first names of authors of
books and articles-on the condition that we added an explanation taking full responsibility
for the deviation from the form. See Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law,
Literature, and Feminism, 99 Yale L.J. 1913, 1913 n.** (1990). We included first names
because the use of only last names not only limited access (when authors have common names)
and often relied on reader recognition of the already well-known but also prevented knowing
the authors' gender. Furthermore, one popular citation system privileged those people who
write books over people who write articles; authors of books got their first initial included in
the cite, while authors of articles did not. Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain inclusion
of the full names of litigants. With the full names of litigants, one might not assume for
example that all welfare recipients are women. Rather, one would know that the lead plaintiff
in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), was John Kelly, and not the fictional "Mrs.
Kelly"-the prototypically female welfare recipient often invoked by those who read extracts
in law school casebooks.
With the 1991 publication of the fifteenth edition of "The Bluebook: A Uniform System of
Citation"-the citation form book compiled by the law reviews and journals of Columbia,
Harvard, University of Pennsylvania, and Yale and used by many law journals-comes
acceptance of a revised footnote format. The new policy is to include first names of authors of
both books and articles. See The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation 111 (15th ed. 1991)
("For signed materials appearing in periodicals (including student-written materials), give the
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hierarchy, and I have suggested how feminist theory might influence one's
approach to these questions. I have not given "answers," and thus have not
conformed to the "standard" law review format-in which a problem is laid
out, some caselaw and other literature discussed, and then a proposal about
what "to do" set forth, all to be attributed to the author of the work. In
contrast, feminist essays often raise either new questions or related ques-
dons from different vantage points. Much feminist work is not devoted to
"specific" answers as much as to opening up a process of conversation in
which, collectively, ideas are explored and then alternative modes sug-
gested by virtue of an extended exchange.
"Women's issues" infuse teaching, text, and footnotes. I do not see any
place, any subject matter in the law school curriculum in which one can
"stay away" from "women's issues." And rather than trying to keep a low
profile on women's issues, I take this symposium, the conference that
engendered it, and the wealth of commentary and literature invoked as
marking a very visible celebration of the interdependencies of women's
issues and law.
author's full name ..."; using as the first example, "Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik,
Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism, 99 Yale L.J. 1913, 1942 n.122 (1990)"). Hopefully,
litigants will soon share the privilege-naming themselves-now enjoyed by writers.
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